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1.

Introduction
The link between accounting information and the cost of capital of firms is one of the

most fundamental issues in accounting. Standard setters frequently refer to it. For example,
Arthur Levitt (1998), the former chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, suggests
that “high quality accounting standards […] reduce capital costs.” Similarly, Neel Foster (2003),
a former member of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) claims that “More
information always equates to less uncertainty, and […] people pay more for certainty. In the
context of financial information, the end result is that better disclosure results in a lower cost of
capital.” While these claims have intuitive appeal, there is surprisingly little theoretical work on
the hypothesized link.
In particular, it is unclear to what extent accounting information or firm disclosures
reduce non-diversifiable risks in economies with multiple securities. Asset pricing models, such
as the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), and portfolio theory emphasize the importance of
distinguishing between risks that are diversifiable and those that are not. Thus, the challenge for
accounting researchers is to demonstrate whether and how firms’ accounting information
manifests in their cost of capital, despite the forces of diversification.
This paper explores both of these questions. We define the cost of capital as the expected
return on a firm’s stock. This definition is consistent with standard asset pricing models in
finance (e.g., Fama and Miller, 1972, p. 303), as well as numerous studies in accounting that use
discounted cash flow or abnormal earnings models to infer firms’ cost of capital (e.g., Botosan,
1997; Gebhardt et al., 2001).1 In our model, we explicitly allow for multiple firms whose cash
flows are correlated. In contrast, most analytical models in accounting examine the role of
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We also discuss the impact of information on price, as the latter is sometimes used as a measure of cost of capital.
See, e.g., Easley and O’Hara (2004) and Hughes et al. (2005).

information in single-firm settings (see Verrecchia, 2001, for a survey). While this literature
yields many useful insights, its applicability to cost of capital issues is limited. In single-firm
settings, firm-specific variance is priced because there are no alternative securities that allow
investors to diversify idiosyncratic risks.
We begin with a model of a multi-security economy that is consistent with the CAPM.
We then recast the CAPM, which is expressed in terms of returns, into a more easily interpreted
formulation that is expressed in terms of the expected values and covariances of future cash
flows. We show that the ratio of the expected future cash flow to the covariance of the firm’s
cash flow with the sum of all cash flows in the market is a key determinant of the cost of capital.
We demonstrate that accounting information influences a firm’s cost of capital in two ways: 1)
direct effects – where higher quality accounting information does not affect cash flows per se,
but affects the market participants’ assessments of the distribution of future cash flows; and 2)
indirect effects – where higher quality accounting information affects a firm’s real decisions,
which influences its expected value and covariances of firm cash flows.
In the first category, we show (not surprisingly) that higher quality information reduces
the assessed variance of a firm’s cash flows. Analogous to the spirit of the CAPM, however, we
show this effect is diversifiable in a “large economy.” We discuss what the concept of
“diversification” means, and show that an economically sensible definition requires more than
simply examining what happens when the number of securities in the economy becomes large.
More surprisingly, we demonstrate that an increase in the quality of a firm’s disclosure
about its own future cash flows has a direct effect on the assessed covariances with other firms’
cash flows. This result builds on and extends the work on “estimation risk” in finance.2 In this
literature, information signals are typically modeled as arising from a historical time-series of
2

See Brown (1979), Barry and Brown (1984 and 1985), Coles and Loewenstein (1988), and Coles et al. (1995).
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return observations. In particular, Barry and Brown (1985) and Coles et al. (1995) compare two
information environments: in one environment the same amount of information (e.g., the same
historical time-series) is available for all firms in the economy, whereas in the other information
environment there are more observations for one group of firms than another. They find that the
betas of the “high information” securities are lower than they would be in the equal information
case. They cannot unambiguously sign, however, the difference in betas for the “low
information” securities in the unequal- versus equal-information environments. Moreover, these
studies do not address the question of how an individual firm’s disclosures can influence its cost
of capital within an unequal information environment.
Rather than restricting attention to signals that are historical observations of returns, our
paper uses a more conventional information-economics approach in which information signals
are related to realized or future cash flows. With this approach, we allow for more general
changes in the information environment, and we are able to prove much stronger results. In
particular, we show that higher quality accounting information and disclosures affect the
assessed covariances with other firms, and this effect unambiguously moves a firm’s cost of
capital closer to the risk-free rate. Moreover, this effect is not diversifiable because it is present
for each of the firm’s covariance terms and hence does not disappear in “large economies.”
Next, we discuss the effects of disclosure regulation on the cost of capital of firms. Using
our framework, it is straightforward to show that increasing the quality of mandated disclosures
also reduces the cost of capital for firms. In addition to the effect of an individual firm’s
disclosures, there is an externality from the disclosures of other firms. We also argue that the
magnitude of the effect of mandated disclosure on cost of capital will be unequal across firms.
Moreover, the reduction in the assessed covariances between firms and the market will not
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always result in a decrease in the beta coefficient of each firm. After all, regardless of the
structure of information in the economy, the average beta across firms has to be 1.0. Therefore,
even though firms’ cost of capital will decline through improved mandated disclosure, their beta
coefficients need not.
In the “indirect effect” category, we show that the quality of accounting information
influences a firm’s cost of capital through its effect on a firm’s real decisions. First, we
demonstrate that if better information reduces the amount of firm cash flows that managers
appropriate for themselves, the improvements in disclosure not only increase price, but in
general also reduce firms’ cost of capital. Second, we allow information quality to change a
firm’s real decisions, e.g., with respect to production or investment. In this case, information
quality changes the ratio of expected cash flow to non-diversifiable covariance risk and hence
influences a firm’s cost of capital. We derive conditions under which an increase in information
quality results in an unambiguous decrease in a firm’s cost of capital.
Our paper makes several contributions. First, we extend and generalize prior work on
estimation risk. We show that information quality directly influences firms’ cost of capital and
that improvements in information quality unambiguously reduce non-diversifiable risks. This
finding is important as it suggests that a firm’s beta factor is a function of its information quality
and disclosures. In this sense, our study provides theoretical guidance to empirical studies that
examine the link between firms’ disclosures and/or information quality, and firms’ cost of capital
(e.g., Botosan, 1997; Botosan and Plumlee, 2002; Francis et al., 2004).3 It is important to
recognize, however, that our information effects are fully captured by an appropriately specified,
forward-looking beta. Thus, our model does not provide support for an additional “information
3

In addition, our study provides an explanation for empirical studies that find differences in disclosure regulation
can explain differences in firms’ equity risk premium (or the average cost of equity capital) across countries (e.g.,
Hail and Leuz, 2006).

4

risk” factor. One way to justify the inclusion of information proxies in a cost of capital model
would be to note that an estimate of beta, which for instance is based on historical data alone,
does generally not capture all information effects. In this case, however, it is incumbent on
accounting researchers to carefully specify a “measurement error” model justifying the inclusion
of information proxies in the empirical specification.4
A second contribution of our paper is that it provides a direct link between information
quality and firms’ cost of capital, without reference to market liquidity. Prior work suggests an
indirect link between disclosure and firms’ cost of capital based on market liquidity and adverse
selection in secondary markets (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Baiman and Verrecchia,
1996; Easley and O’Hara, 2004). These studies, however, analyze settings with a single firm (or
settings where cash flows across firms are uncorrelated). Thus, it is unclear whether the effects
demonstrated in these studies survive the forces of diversification and extend to more general
multi-security settings. We emphasize, however, that we do not dispute the possible role of
market liquidity for firms’ cost of capital, as several empirical studies suggest (e.g., Amihud and
Mendelson, 1986; Chordia et al., 2001; Easley et al., 2002; Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003). Our
paper focuses on an alternative (and possibly more direct) explanation as to how information
quality influences non-diversifiable risks.
Finally, our paper contributes to the literature by showing that information quality has
indirect effects on real decisions, which in turn manifest in firms’ cost of capital. In this sense,
our study relates to work on real effects of accounting information (e.g., Kanodia et al., 2000 and
2004). These studies, however, do not analyze the effects on firms’ cost of capital or nondiversifiable risks.

4
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic model in
a world of homogeneous beliefs, defines terms, and derives the determinants of the cost of
capital. Sections 3 and 4 analyze the direct and indirect effects of accounting information on
firms’ cost of capital, respectively. Section 5 summarizes our findings and concludes the paper.

2.

Model and Cost of Capital Derivation
We define cost of capital to be the expected return on the firm’s stock. Consistent with

standard models of asset pricing, the expected rate of return on a firm j’s stock is the rate, Rj, that
equates the stock price at the beginning of the period, Pj, to the cash flow at the end of the period,
~
V j − Pj
~
~
~
. Our analysis focuses on the expected rate of return, which
Vj: P j (1 + Rj) = V j , or R j =
Pj
~
E (V j | Φ ) − Pj
~
, where Φ is the information available to market participants to
is E ( R j | Φ ) =
Pj

make their assessments regarding the distribution of future cash flows.
We assume there are J securities in the economy whose returns are correlated. The best
known model of asset pricing in such a setting is the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)
(Sharpe, 1964; Linter, 1965). Therefore, we begin our analysis by presenting the conventional
formulation of the CAPM, and then transform this to show how information affects expected
returns. In the CAPM, the expected return on a firm’s stock can be expressed as a function of
~
the risk-free rate, Rf, the expected return on the market, E ( Rm ), and the firm’s beta coefficient,

β j:
~
E (R M | Φ ) − R f
~ ~
~
~
Cov(R j , R m | Φ ) .
E(R j | Φ) = R f + E(R M | Φ) − R f β j = R f +
~
Var (R M | Φ )

[

]

[

6

]

(1)

Eqn. (1) shows that the only firm-specific parameter that affects the firm’s cost of capital is its
beta coefficient, or, more specifically, the covariance of its future return with that of the market
portfolio. This covariance is a forward-looking parameter, and is based on the information
available to market participants. Consistent with the conventional formulation of the CAPM, we
assume market participants possess homogeneous beliefs regarding the expected end-of-period
cash flows and covariances.
Because the CAPM is expressed solely in terms of covariances, this formulation might be
interpreted as implying that other factors, for example the expected cash flows, do not affect the
firm’s cost of capital. It is important to keep in mind, however, that the covariance term in the
CAPM is expressed in terms of returns, not in terms of cash flows. The two are related via the
~

⎡
⎤
V
equation Cov( R~ j , R~M ) = ⎢Cov( j , VM )⎥ =
⎣⎢

~

Pj PM ⎦⎥

1
~ ~
Cov(V j ,VM ) . This means that information
Pj PM

potentially affects the expected return on a firm’s stock through its effect on inferences about the
covariances of future cash flows, or through the current period stock price, or both. Clearly the
current stock price is a function of the expected-end-of-period cash flow. In particular, the
CAPM can be re-expressed in terms of prices instead of returns as follows (see Fama ,1976, eqn.
[83]):
~
J
⎤
E (VM | Φ ) − (1 + R f ) PM ⎡
~
~
~
⎢
⎥
(
,
|
)
V
Cov
V
Φ
E (V j | Φ ) −
~
j ∑ k
Var (VM | Φ )
⎢
⎥
k =1
⎣
⎦,
Pj =
1+ Rf

j = 1, …, J.

(2)

Eqn. (2) indicates that the current price of a firm can be expressed as the expected end-of-period
cash flow minus a reduction for risk. This risk-adjusted expected value is then discounted to the
beginning of the period at the risk-free rate. The risk reduction factor in the numerator of eqn. (2)
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has both a macro-economic factor,

~
E (VM | Φ ) − (1 + R f ) PM
, and a firm-component, which is
~
Var (VM | Φ )

determined by the covariance of the firm’s end-of-period cash flows with those of all other firms.
~ J ~
⎤ is a measure of the contribution of firm j to
As in Fama (1976), the term ⎡Cov(V
j , ∑ Vk | Φ ) ⎥
⎢
k =1
⎦
⎣
J ~
~
the overall variance of the market cash flows, VM = ∑ Vk .
k =1

Eqns. (1) and (2) express expected returns and pricing on a relative basis: that is, relative
to the market. If we make more specific assumptions regarding investors’ preferences, we can
express prices and returns on an absolute basis.5 In particular, if the economy consists of N
investors with negative exponential utility with risk tolerance parameter τ, the beginning-ofperiod stock price can be expressed as (details in the Appendix):
J
⎤
1 ⎡
~
~
~
⎢Cov (V j , ∑ Vk | Φ )⎥
E (V j | Φ ) −
Nτ ⎢
⎥
k =1
⎣
⎦
Pj =
1+ Rf

.

(3)

As in eqn. (2), price in eqn. (3) is equal to the expected end-of-period cash flow minus a
reduction for the riskiness of firm j, all discounted back to the beginning of the period at the riskfree rate. The discount for risk is now simply the contribution of firm j’s cash flows to the
aggregate risk of the market divided by the term Nτ, which is the aggregate risk tolerance of the
marketplace. The price of the market portfolio can be found by summing eqn. (3) across all
1
~
~
firms: (1 + R f ) PM = E (VM | Φ ) −
Var (VM | Φ ) , which can also be expressed as
Nτ

5

More specifically, the pricing and return formulas will be expressed relative to the risk free rate, which acts as the
numeraire in the economy.
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~
E (VM | Φ ) − (1 + R f ) PM
1
. Therefore, the aggregate risk tolerance of the market determines
=
~
Nτ
Var (VM | Φ )

the risk premium for market-wide risk.
We can re-arrange eqn. (3) to express the expected return on the firm’s stock as follows.
Lemma 1. The cost of capital for firm j is
J
⎤
1 ⎡
~
~
~
⎢
⎥
R
E
V
Cov
V
V
(
|
)
(
,
Φ
+
|
Φ
)
∑
f
j
j
k
~
Nτ ⎢
⎥
E (V j | Φ ) − P j
~
k =1
⎣
⎦.
E ( R j | Φ) =
=
J
Pj
⎡
⎤
1
~
~
~
⎢Cov (V j , ∑ Vk | Φ ) ⎥
E (V j ) −
Nτ ⎢
⎥
k =1
⎣
⎦

~

J

(4a)

~

If we further assume that Cov(Vj , ∑ Vk | Φ ) ≠ 0, this reduces to
k =1

R f H (Φ ) + 1
~
, where
E ( R j | Φ) =
H (Φ ) − 1

~
E (V j | Φ )

H (Φ ) =

1
~
Cov(V j ,
Nτ

J

.

(4b)

~

∑ Vk | Φ)

k =1

Lemma 1 shows that the cost of capital of the firm depends on four factors: the risk free rate, the
aggregate risk tolerance of the market, the expected cash flow of the firm, and the covariance of
the firm’s cash flow with the sum of all the firms’ cash flows in the market. The latter three
terms can be combined into the ratio of the firm j’s expected cash flows, to firm j’s contribution
to aggregate risk per-unit-of aggregate risk tolerance. Note that the definition of cost of capital
in Lemma 1 does not require that firm j’s expected cash flow, or the covariance of that cash flow
with the market, be of any particular sign.
In the next result we show how a change in each of the four factors affects cost of capital.

~
Proposition 1. Ceteris paribus the cost of capital for firm j, E(R j ), is:
(a) increasing (decreasing) in the risk free rate, Rf , when the expected cash flow and the
price of the firm have the same (different) sign;
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(b) decreasing (increasing) in the aggregate risk tolerance of the market, Nτ, when the
expected cash flow and covariance of that cash flow with the market have the same
(different) sign;
~
(c) decreasing (increasing) in the expected end-of-period cash flow, E(V j ) , when
~ J ~
Cov(V j , ∑ Vk ) is positive (negative); and
k =1
~
~ J ~
(d) increasing (decreasing) in Cov(V j , ∑ Vk ) when E(V j ) is positive (negative).
k =1
To make the intuition that underlies Proposition 1 as transparent as possible, consider the case in
which firm j’s expected end-of-period cash flow, the covariance between its end-of-period cash
flows and the market, and the firm’s beginning-of-period stock price are all positive. Here, the
reason why the expected return on firm j is increasing in the risk-free rate is clear, because this
provides the baseline return for all securities. When Nτ increases, the aggregate risk tolerance of
the market increases; hence, the discount applied to each firm’s riskiness decreases.6 This moves
~ J ~
the firm’s expected rate of return closer to the risk-free rate. When Cov(V j , ∑ Vk ) increases,
k =1
the contribution of the riskiness of firm j’s cash flows to the overall riskiness of the market goes
up; hence, the expected return must increase to compensate investors for the increase in risk.
This is one of the key insights of the CAPM (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965).
The most surprising result is that an increase in the expected value of cash flows
decreases the expected rate of return. The intuition, however, is fairly straightforward. Consider
a firm with two components of cash flow: a riskless component ( V a ) and a risky component
j
( V b ). Clearly the cost of capital for the firm will be somewhere in between the cost of capital
j
6

This is analogous to the effect discussed in Merton (1987).
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for the riskless component and the cost of capital for the risky component. But if the firm’s
expected cash flow increases without affecting the firm’s variances or covariances, this is exactly
analogous to adding a new riskless component of cash flows to the firm’s existing cash flows.
The firm’s cost of capital therefore decreases.
The results above vary one effect at a time, holding the others constant. But what if the
expected cash flows and the covariance change simultaneously? For the special case where
expected cash flows and the covariance both change in exactly the same proportion, it is easy to
see that the numerator and denominator each change by that proportion in eqn. (4), and thus
cancel out. In this special case, there is no effect on the cost of capital. There is an effect,
however, for any simultaneous change that is not exactly proportionate on the two terms.
While it is common in some corporate finance and valuation models to assume that the
level of cash flow and the covariances move in exact proportion to each other (i.e., all cash flows
are from the same risk class), we are unaware of any theoretical results or empirical evidence to
suggest this should be the case. On the contrary, the existence of fixed costs in the production
function, economies of scale, etc., generally make the expected values and covariances of firm’s
cash flows change in ways that are not exactly proportional to each other. Moreover, there is
ample empirical evidence that betas vary over time, which implies the ratio of expected cash
flow to overall covariance varies, suggesting that new information has an impact as it becomes
available.
There is nothing in Proposition 1 that is specific to accounting information. Any shock –
new regulations, taxes, inventions, etc. – that affects the H term has a corresponding effect on the
firm’s expected return. In the following two sections we focus on how accounting information
impacts the H(Φ) ratio in the cost of capital equation. In section 3, we show how, holding the
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real decision of the firm fixed, accounting information affects the assessments made by market
participants of the distribution of future cash flows, and how this assessment impacts the firm’s
cost of capital. In section 4, we show that accounting information affects real actions within the
firm, and that this naturally leads to changes in the risk-return characteristics of the firm, thereby
affecting the firm’s cost of capital.

3.

Direct Effects of Information on the Cost of Capital

In this section we hold constant the real (operating, investing, and financing) decisions of
the firm (we relax this in Section 4). Even though accounting and disclosure policies do not
affect the real cash flows of the firm here, they affect the assessments that market participants
have regarding the distribution of these future cash flows. As a result, they affect equilibrium
stock prices and expected returns. In particular, eqns. (3) and (4) show that stock price and the
expected return are, respectively, decreasing and increasing functions of the covariance of a
firm’s end-of-period cash flow with the sum of all firms’ end-of period cash flows. In the next
two sub-sections, we discuss the two components of this covariance: the firm’s own variance and
~ J ~
~ ~
~
~
the covariances with other firms, Cov(V j , ∑ Vk ) = Cov(V j , V j ) + Cov(V j , ∑ Vk ).
k =1

3.1

k≠ j

Direct Effects – Through the Variance of the Firm’s Cash Flow

The idea that better quality accounting information reduces the assessed variance of the
firm’s cash flow is well known. As an application, consider the impact on the cost of capital of
firm j if more information becomes available (either through more transparent accounting rules,
additional firm disclosure, or greater information search by investors). Suppose the firm’s
investment decisions have been made; let V0j and ω j represent the ex-ante expected value and
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ex-ante precision of the end-of-period cash flow, respectively. Suppose investors receive Q

independently distributed signals, zj1,...,zjQ, about the ultimate realization of firm j’s cash flow,
where each signal has precision γ j . Then investors’ posterior distribution for end-of-period
cash flow has a normal distribution with mean

~
E (V j | z j1,..., z jQ ) =

ωj
ω j + Qγ j

V0 j +

γj

Q

∑ z jq , and precision ω j + Qγ j .

ω j + Qγ j q =1

Therefore, using part d of Proposition 1, the expected return is a decreasing function of the
precision, ω j + Qγ j . This implies that the firm’s cost of capital declines with: 1) an increase in
the prior precision, ωj; 2) the number of new signals, Q; or 3) the precision of these signals, γj.
The firm-specific variance reduction effect is an important factor in the cost of capital
analysis of Easley and O’Hara (2004). While their paper models a multi-security economy, the
assumption that all cash flows are independently distributed implies that the pricing of each firm
is also done independently. In particular, if we simplify their model to remove the private
information component of their model, their pricing equation reduces to:
x
1
~
,
Pj = E (V j ) −
Nτ ω j + Qγ j

(5)

where x is the supply of the risky asset (and the analysis assumes the risk-free rate is zero).
Therefore, the impact of information on the equilibrium price is similar to our eqn. (3).7 As more
public signals are generated, the assessed variance of the firm’s cash flows goes down.

7

In other work, we show that, contrary to their claims, the other effect on the cost of capital in Easley and O’Hara
(2004) is not driven by the asymmetry of information across investors. Instead, it is the average precision of
investor’s information that is the determinant of the cost of capital in their model. Moreover, the same argument we
use here implies that their “information effect,” regardless of their interpretation, is diversifiable as the economy
gets large.
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The analysis above formalizes the notion that accounting information and disclosure
reduce the assessed variance of the firm’s end-of-period cash flows. As eqn. (3) shows, this is
one of the components of the covariance of the firm’s cash flow with those of all firms.
Therefore, ceteris paribus, reducing the assessed variance of the firm’s cash flows increases the
firm’s stock price and reduces the firm’s expected return. Moreover, because this is an
additively separate term in the overall covariance, the magnitude of this impact on price does not
depend on how highly the firm’s cash flows co-vary with those of other firms. For example, a
decrease of, say, 10 percent in the assessed variance of firm cash flows has the same dollar effect
on stock price regardless of the degree of covariance with other cash flows. Clearly, for a given

finite value of N (the number of investors) and J (the number of firms in the economy), there is a
non-zero effect on price and on the cost of capital of reducing the assessment of firm-variance.
Next we address the question of the diversifiability (or magnitude) of the effect of
reducing the market’s assessed variance of the firm’s cash flows. Intuitively, the notion that a
risk is diversifiable is usually expressed in terms of how it affects the variance of a portfolio as
the number of firms in the portfolio gets large.8 To examine this more rigorously, we must
ensure that economy-wide risks are absorbed by the market participants collectively, and
economy-wide risks are priced. This implies that J (the number of securities) and N (the number
of investors) must both get large. To see this, consider as one polar case a situation in which the
number of firms in the economy increases, while holding the number of investors fixed. This
does make the contribution of firm variance small relative to the covariance with all firms
(assuming firms’ covariances tend to be positive). It also increases, however, the aggregate risk

8

In particular, the variance of an equally weighted portfolio of J securities can be expressed as

J −1
1
1 ~
~ ~
~
AverageCov ( R j , R k ). As J gets large this converges to the average covariance
Variance ( ∑ R j ) = AverageVar ( R j ) +
J
J
J j

between the returns in the portfolio. The individual variances of the firms’ returns asymptotically disappear.
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J
~ ~
in the economy: that is, ∑ Cov(V j ,Vk ) increases without bound. This drives prices lower and
k =1

results in an infinite increase in the expected return required to hold the stock (see eqns. [3] and
[4]). On the other hand, consider as the other polar case a situation where N, the number of
investors in the economy, spreads all risks (not just firms’ variances) over more investors, which
reduces all risk premiums and decreases all expected returns. In the limit,
1 J
~ ~
∑ Cov(V j ,Vk ) approaches zero for each firm and even for the market; therefore, no risks are
N k =1
priced. To avoid these uninteresting, polar cases, J and N must both increase for the notion of
“diversifiability” to be meaningful.
When J and N both increase, the effect of firm-variance on the cost of capital,
1
~ ~
Cov(V j ,V j ), asymptotically approaches zero, because this term only appears once in the
Nτ
overall covariance for a firm.9 The covariance with other firms, however,

1
~ ~
∑ Cov(V j ,Vk ),
Nτ k ≠ j

survives because the number of covariance terms (J-1) also increases as the economy gets large.
In the next section, we analyze how information affects the covariance terms.

3.2

Direct Effect – Through the Covariance with other Firms’ Cash Flows

In this section, we show that information about a firm’s future cash flows also affects the
assessed covariance with other firms. Our work in this section builds on the estimation risk
literature in finance (See Brown,1979; Barry and Brown;1984 and 1985; Coles and

9

In our simplified version of the Easley and O’Hara result (our eqn. [5]), as N gets large, the last term on the righthand side of the equation approaches zero. Therefore, the firm is priced as if it is riskless (recall that Easley and
O’Hara assume there are no covariances with other firms). Similarly, in their “full blown” model (see their
proposition 2), as N gets large the per-capita supply of the firm’s stock goes to zero, and again the pricing equation
collapses to a risk-neutral one.
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Loewenstein,1988; and Coles et al., 1995). Specifically, our work differs from this literature in
three important ways. First, the estimation risk literature generally focuses on the impact of the
information environment on the beta of the firm, whereas our focus is on the cost of capital.
Because the information structures analyzed in this literature generally affect all firms in the
economy, the impact on beta is confounded by the simultaneous impact on the covariances
between firms and the variance of the market portfolio. This is one reason why they obtain
results that are mixed or difficult to sign. By focusing on the cost of capital, we can analyze the
impact of both effects.
Second, the estimation literature focuses on very specific changes in the information
environment. Some papers examine the impact of increasing equally the amount of information
for all firms. Other papers compare two information environments: an environment where all
firms have an equal amount of information to an environment where one subgroup of firms has
more information available than does a second group. Our framework allows us to analyze more
general changes in information structures: both mandatory and voluntary. In particular, unlike
the prior literature, we are able to address the question of how more information about one firm
affects its own cost of capital within an unequal information environment.
Finally, our model represents the information signals differently than in the estimation
risk literature. The estimation risk literature assumes the information signals available about the
firms arise from historical time-series observations of the firms returns. While this literature
claims that the intuition behind their results applies to information more generally, the assumed
time-series nature of their information signals drives a substantial element of the covariance
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structure in their models. In particular, new information signals are conditionally correlated with
contemporaneously observed signals and conditionally independent of all other signals.10
We model a more general information structure that allows us to examine alternative
covariance structures of the signals. Specifically, we model information signals as representing
noisy measures of the variables of interest, which are end-of-period cash flows. That is, an

~
~
~
~
information signal, Z j , about firm j’s cash flow, V j , is modeled as Z j = V j + ε~ j , where ε~ j is
the “noise” or “measurement error” in the information signal. Depending on the correlation
~
structure assumed about the cash flows and error terms, Z j , could also be informative about the
cash flow of other firms, as well as informative in updating the assessed variances and
covariances of end-of-period cash flows. This formulation of information is consistent with the
way information is modeled in virtually all conventional statistical inference problems (see
DeGroot, 1970). It is also consistent with virtually all papers in the vast noisy rational
expectations literature in accounting and finance (see Verrecchia, 2001, for a review).
Our characterization of disclosures as noisy signals about firms’ future cash flows (or
other performance measures) also corresponds to actual disclosure practices. Firms disclose
information about their earnings, which is the sum of their market, industry, and idiosyncratic
components. Similarly, other disclosures such as revenues or cash flow are also about the firm

10

See Kalymon (1971) for the original derivation of the covariance matrix used in much of this literature.
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as whole.11 Analysts’ forecasts of future earnings are about the earnings of the firm, not just of
the “firm specific” component of future earnings.12
To provide a simple initial example, suppose that the future cash flows for two firms have
~ ~
an ex-ante covariance of Cov(V j ,Vk ) , which is non-zero. Suppose we observe an information
~
~
signal about firm j, Z j , which is a noisy signal about firm j’s future cash flow, V j . For
~
convenience, assume that the error term ε~ j is uncorrelated with either of the true cash flows V j
~
~
or Vk . As in the previous section, a greater precision of the information signal Z j about firm

~
j’s cash flow leads to a smaller posterior variance of V j .
~
Moreover, we can also show that the information signal Z j also leads to an updating of
~
~
the covariance between the two cash flows V j and Vk . In particular, it is straightforward to
show the following.
Proposition 2. The covariance between the cash flows of firms j and k conditional upon a

~ ~
signal about firm j’s cash flow moves away from the unconditional Cov (V j , Vk ) and closer to
zero as the precision of firm j’s signal increases. Specifically,

~
~ ~
~ ~ Var (ε j )
Cov(V j ,Vk | Z j ) = Cov(V j ,Vk )
~ .
Var ( Z j )
11

(6)

In contrast, Hughes et al. (2005) model information signals as being artificially decomposed into “market” and
“idiosyncratic factors.” Moreover, in our model cash flows have a completely general variance-covariance
structure, whereas the analysis in Hughes et al. assumes a very specific “factor” structure. Similarly, the betas and
covariances that turn out to be relevant in our pricing equations are relative to the market portfolio (the sum of all
firm’s cash flows), whereas in Hughes et al. the betas and covariances are relative to the exogenously specified
“common factors.”
12
While the idea that the earnings of a firm can be useful in predicting future cash flows of the industry or the
market as a whole might seem counterintuitive, there is empirical evidence to support this. See Piotroski and
Roulstone (2004) about how the activities of market participants (analysts, institutional traders, and insiders)
impacts the incorporation of firm specific versus industry versus market components of future earnings into prices.
See also the “information transfer” literature (e.g., Foster, 1981). As we show, it is not necessary that there be a
“large” effect of firm j’s disclosures on other firms.
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~
~
Therefore, the conditional covariance between V j and Vk is equal to the unconditional
covariance, times a factor that can be interpreted as the percentage of the variance of the
information signal that consists of noise or measurement error.
~
~
~
As the measurement error in Z j goes down, the assessed covariance between V j and Vk
decreases (in absolute value). The intuition is as follow. If there is infinite measurement error in
~
~
Z j , then observing Z j does not communicate anything. Therefore, there is no need to update
~
~
an assessment of the unconditional variance of V j , or the unconditional covariance between V j
~
~
~
and Vk . At the other extreme, if there is no measurement error in Z j , then observing Z j is the

~
~
~
~
same as observing V j . But if V j is observed, there is no further covariance between V j and Vk ;
hence, the assessed covariance goes to zero. Note that Proposition 2 does not require that the
~
~
~
unconditional covariance between V j and Vk be positive; as the measurement error in Z j goes
~
~
down, the assessed covariance between V j and Vk moves closer to zero, irrespective of its sign.
Proposition 2 applies equally to the conditional covariances with all other firms in the
economy. This implies that
J Var (ε~ j )
Var (ε~ j )
~ J ~
~ ~
~ ~
Cov
(
V
(
,
)
Cov
V
V
=
∑ Cov(V j ,Vk | Z j ) = ∑
~
~
j k
j , ∑ Vk ).
Var ( Z j )
k =1
k =1 Var ( Z j )
k =1
J

Therefore, the conditional covariance between the cash flows of firm j and those of the market as
a whole is proportional to the amount of measurement error in the information signal about firm
j’s cash flow. Moreover, this effect does not diversify away in large economies: the effect is
present for each and every covariance term with firm j.
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For example, suppose the distribution of cash flows is represented as a “single-factor
~
~
index model,” so that the cash flow for firm j is V j = a j + b jθ + u~ j , where θ is a “market
factor” and uj is a firm specific factor. For convenience, let all the uj’s be distributed
independently. Let the information signal about firm j be a noisy measure of its cash flow,
~
~
Z j = V j + ε~ j , where the error terms are distributed independently of the true cash flows, as well
as each other. Then the unconditional covariance between the cash flows of firms j and k is
~
bjbkVariance( θ ), and the conditional covariance given the signal Zj is

~
~ Variance(ε j )
~ ~
Cov(V j ,Vk | Z j ) = b j bkVariance(θ )
~ , which implies
Variance( Z j )
~
Cov(V j ,

~
~ Variance(ε j )
~
∑ Vk | Z j ) = b jVariance(θ ) Variance(Z~ ) ∑ bk .
j k≠ j
k≠ j

As before, the posterior covariance between firm j and “the market” decreases as the quality of
the information about firm j’s future cash flow improves.
These findings are in contrast to those in a concurrent paper by Hughes et al. (2005),
which employs more restrictive and less natural information structures. For example, Hughes et

al. show that if the information concerns exclusively the idiosyncratic component of a firm's
cash flows, not the cash flows per se, and the information signal matrix is exclusively diagonal,
then there is no covariance effect. That is, under these conditions, the information signals are,
by definition, unrelated to the component of cash flows that varies across firms, so they cannot
be useful in updating the assessed covariance.
Hughes et al. also considers an information structure that relates only to the “common
factor” portion of cash flows. In this case, information does affect the covariance between a
firm’s cash flows and the common factors. Similarly, the covariance between the cash flows of
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any two firms that are both affected by this common factor will also change. While this result is
similar in some ways to ours, the nature of the cross-sectional impact on the covariance, and
therefore the cost of capital, differs in their paper because of the different information structure
assumed.
When the information is about the cash flow as a whole, we find that virtually any more
~ ~ ~
~
~
~
general representation of V j , Vk , Z j and/or Z k results in Z j and Z k changing the covariance
~
~
of V j and Vk , which is the effect that we obtain in our general variance-covariance framework.
Thus, we claim that in general information about firm cash flows (or other measures of firm
performance) has a covariance effect, and hence leads to cross-sectional differences in firms’
cost of capital. In particular, at the extreme, if information could fully reveal the firm’s future
cash flow, the cash flow would, by definition, be riskless and the cost of capital on the firm’s
stock would converge to the risk free rate.
It is possible to expand the analysis in this section in several ways. For example, in
Proposition 2, we refer to the covariance between the cash flows of firms j and k conditional on
(a single) firm j providing information about its cash flow. In the proof of Proposition 2 in the
appendix, we offer a more general result based on computing the covariance of cash flows
conditional on both firms j and k providing information about their respective cash flows. The
analysis could be generalized further to allow all firms in the economy to provide information
about their respective cash flows. It is important to point out that, even in the case where all
firms provide information, it is not necessarily the case that the uncertainty about the market cash
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flow is eliminated. If each firm discloses its realized cash flow with noise, uncertainty about the
market cash flow will grow as the number of firms in the economy grows.13
Another possible extension is that in our paper (as is true in most of the rational
expectations literature) we interpret the signals as being related to the realized cash flow. We
can also conduct the analysis by interpreting them instead as signals about the future expected

cash flow (or parameters of the distribution of future cash flows). In fact, most of the estimation
risk literature interprets the signals in this way. Of course, when learning about the expected
future cash flow, as opposed to the realized future cash flow, a perfect signal does not resolve all
uncertainty, so the asset does not become riskless. Nonetheless, better information reduces the
covariances. We can also repeat the analysis under alternative assumptions regarding what
parameters of the distribution of future cash flows are uncertain: 1) the expected cash flows are
unknown but the covariance matrix is known; or 2) the expected cash flows and the covariance
matrix are both unknown. We could also allow the error terms ( ε~ j ’s) to be correlated across
firms and examine the implications of this.

3.3

The Effects of Mandatory Disclosures

In the previous sections, we analyze the impact of changing the quality of accounting
information for a single firm on its price and cost of capital. We now briefly discuss the effects
of mandatory disclosure of accounting information. The main difference is that disclosure
regulation affects all firms. Therefore, in addition to the impact of firm j’s disclosure on, say, the
covariance between the cash flows of firms j and k, there is an additional impact on this
covariance by firm k’s disclosures. In principle, disclosure by other firms can have a (small)
13

In contrast, if each firm discloses the aggregate market cash flow with idiosyncratic noise, disclosures by many
firms reveals the market cash flow in the limit; thus, there would be no aggregate uncertainty. This information
structure, however, is not very descriptive of what firms do.

22

impact on the covariance with firm j. That is, each firm’s disclosure has an externality on other
firms’ cost of capital. This positive externality provides potentially a reason why there could be
benefits to disclosure regulation, rather than relying on voluntary disclosures, because firms will
not take this externality into account when deciding the optimal level of voluntary disclosure.
While this effect is small individually, it could become large collectively.14
Using our framework, it is therefore straightforward to show that increasing the quality of
mandated disclosures reduces the cost of capital for all firms in the economy (assuming that the
expected cash flow of each firm in the economy and the covariance of that firm’s cash flow with
the market have the same sign). The magnitude of the impact of mandatory disclosure, however,
on a particular firm’s cost of capital is less clear-cut. Even if mandatory disclosures affect all
elements of the covariance matrix of future cash flows by a scale factor, the effect on the cost of
capital is not proportionate for all firms. It follows from the pricing formula in eqn. (2) that even
if the impact on the covariances of future cash flows is proportionate, the effect on the expected
values of future cash flows is unlikely to have the same scale factor. Therefore, the prices of all
firms will not change proportionately. Thus, using eqn. (4), the firms’ expected returns (and cost
of capital) will not change by the same proportion for all firms either.15
Moreover, it seems unlikely that mandated disclosures alters the entire covariance matrix
of all firms’ future cash flows by the same scale factor. The amount of new information
provided by a particular mandated disclosure depends on what other information the firm already
14

See Admati and Pfleiderer (2000) and Fishman and Hagerty (1989) for other externality-based explanations of
mandatory disclosure.
15
Some early models in the estimation risk literature in finance (e.g., Kalymon, 1971; Brown, 1979) assumed that
information had a proportionate impact on the covariance matrix of returns, and some found that information would
not affect the betas of firms. This result occurred because (by assumption) all the covariances and variances of
firms’ returns changed proportionately. Therefore, there was no effect on the beta coefficient of returns, which is the
ratio of the covariance of the firm’s return to the market divided by the variance of the market return, because the
numerator and denominator changed by the same scale factor. It is more natural to assume, however, that the impact
of information is on the assessed distribution of cash flows, not returns. See Coles and Lowenstein (1988) for
similar discussion.

23

discloses. For some firms, this disclosure requirement duplicates other disclosures, in which
case it provides no additional information; for others it may provide a small amount of
incremental information, and for others still it may be completely new. These information
effects imply an unequal impact of disclosure regulation on the individual elements of the
covariance matrix of future cash flows. Thus, firms are likely to benefit from mandatory
disclosures differentially.
It is important to distinguish between the impact of mandated disclosure on the cost of
capital and the impact on the beta coefficient. Our formulation allows us to express the cost of
capital in a reduced form that depends on assessed covariance between the cash flow of the firm
and the cash flows of all firms in the market. Even though mandated disclosure reduces the cost
of capital for firms, this does not imply that it reduces all beta coefficients similarly. Instead, the
lowered covariance between end-of-period cash flows implies a reduction in the product of the
impact on the market risk premium and the beta coefficient; it does not imply a reduction in the
beta coefficient separately. In fact, the average beta in the economy must still be 1.0, regardless
of the quality of the information environment. Therefore, mandated disclosure cannot reduce all
firms’ betas. This suggests that researchers interested in examining the effect of mandated
disclosures on costs of capital must look to alternative measures for cost of capital than the beta
coefficient.

4.

Indirect Effects of Information on Cost of Capital

In this section, we show how the quality of the accounting and disclosure system has an
indirect impact the firm’s cost of capital through its effect on real decisions that impact the
expected cash flows and covariances of cash flows. Clearly, decision-makers in an economy
make decisions on the basis of the information they have available to them. If this information
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changes, so will their decisions. To the extent these new decisions alter the distribution of the
firm’s end-of-period-cash flow, this impacts the firm’s cost of capital. In particular, as we
showed in Proposition 1, if the ratio of the firm’s expected cash flow to the covariance between
the firm’s cash flow and the sum of all other firms’ cash flows changes (our parameter H in our
Lemma 1), the expected rate of return on the firm’s stock will change, and by definition, so will
its cost of capital.
The potential scope of the decisions that a firm’s accounting and disclosure systems may
affect can be quite broad. In addition to the decisions of investors and creditors, a firm’s
accounting and disclosure systems may affect managerial actions, as well as the potential actions
of competitors, regulatory authorities, etc. The impact on the firm’s cost of capital can be either
positive or negative. To be able to predict the “indirect effect” of accounting information on the
firm’s cost of capital therefore requires the researcher to carefully specify: 1) the link between
information and these decisions; and 2) the impact of these decisions on the distribution of future
cash flows. We provide two simple examples to illustrate these issues. In one, accounting
information affects the amount of cash that is appropriated from investors. In the second,
accounting information changes a manager’s investment decisions.

4.1

Information, Governance, and Appropriation

Many papers (e.g., in agency theory) have suggested that better financial reporting and/or
corporate governance increases firm value by reducing the amount that managers appropriate for
themselves (e.g., LaPorta et. al., 1997; Lambert, 2001). These papers, however, do not discuss
the impact that these systems have on the firm’s cost of capital. In fact, some of them claim that
these systems have a “one-time” effect on price, but do not affect the cost of capital as defined
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by the discount rate implicit in the firm’s stock valuation. An exception is Lombardo and
Pagano (2000) (LP), a paper that also analyzes the impact of governance and appropriation on
firm’s cost of capital. We compare our model and results to LP below.
~
Represent the “gross” end-of-period cash flow of firm j before any appropriation by V j*.
As before, we assume this cash flow has a normal distribution. Managers appropriate for
themselves an amount A that decreases with the quality of the information and/or governance
systems. By accounting systems here, we do not mean simply the disclosures the firm makes to
outsiders, but also internal control systems, corporate governance policies, etc.16 Clearly, a more
sophisticated analysis could be conducted that endogenously derives the functional form of A
and/or determines the types of information that lead to the largest reductions in A, but these
features are not necessary to make our point.
In particular, the amount of the firm’s end-of-period cash flows that is appropriated from
shareholders is A(Q) = A0 (Q) + A1 (Q)V j* , where Q is the quality of the accounting system, etc.,
and V* is the value of the firm gross of any appropriation.17 A higher quality accounting system
is assumed to reduce the amount of misappropriation: A ′0 ≤ 0 and A1′ ≤ 0 . This means that the
net amount received by the firm’s shareholders is

~
~
~
V j = V j* − A(Q) = (1 − A1(Q))V j* − A0 (Q).

16

More generally, the amount a manager could appropriate would also depend on dimensions of the legal system,
such as the ability to bring lawsuits against the firm and/or managers.
17
LP analyze a model that also has a parameter analogous to our A1, which reduces the cash flow available to
shareholders by a fractional amount. LP do not have a parameter, however, that corresponds exactly to our A0,
which reduces the end-of-period cash flow by a constant. Instead LP have a cost that shareholders pay out of their
own pocket for auditing and legal fees. This fee is proportional to the share price, which obviously depends on the
expected end-of-period cash flow. Another difference is that in LP appropriation parameters are economy-wide (or
for segments of the market), whereas ours can be firm-specific. Finally, we explicitly analyze the impact the
appropriation parameters have on the riskiness of the end-of-period cash flow (variances and covariances), whereas
these are not issues addressed in LP.
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This representation allows us to calculate the expected value of the firm’s cash flow and its
covariance with other firms’ cash flows as a function of the quality of the information and/or
governance quality parameter, Q. We can then apply Lemma 1 to determine the effect on the
firm’s cost of capital.
Proposition 3: Higher quality information that reduces managerial misappropriation of the

firm’s cash flow weakly reduces the firm’s cost of capital. If A0 = 0 and A ′0 = 0 (so that
information only affects the A1 term), then information has no effect on the cost of capital.
Otherwise, improved information lowers the cost of capital to the firm.
One special case arises when the quality of the information and/or governance system
affects only the “fixed amount” (A0) the manager appropriates. In this case, increasing the
quality of the accounting system increases the expected cash flow available to shareholders by
reducing A0. It does not affect, however, the covariance of the firm’s net cash flows with those
of other firms. Therefore, not surprisingly, a higher quality accounting system increases the price
of the firm. What is more surprising is that the information system also leads to a change in the
firm’s cost of capital. Our model shows that the reason is straightforward: the ratio of the
expected cash flows to the covariance shifts.
At the other extreme, suppose the quality of information affects only the “proportion” of
the firm’s cash flow the manager appropriates: the parameter A1. In this case, improving the
quality of the firm’s information and/or governance system increases the proportion of the firm’s
cash flow available to shareholders. This not only increases the firm’s expected cash flow, but it
also increases the covariance of the firm’s cash flows with other firms by the same proportion. 18

18

Technically, the total covariance does not change in exact proportion to the expected value because the firm’s
covariance with itself will change with the square of the proportionality factor. As in the previous section, however,
the impact of the firm’s own variance on the cost of capital goes to zero as the number of investors gets large. In
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Therefore, the ratio of expected cash flow to covariance of cash flows does not change, and the
firm’s cost of capital is unaffected. LP establishes a similar result. Price increases, but there is
no impact on the firm’s expected rate of return given this “one time” effect on price.
In fact, Proposition 3 indicates that the assumption that the manager’s appropriation is
exactly a fixed proportion of the end-of-period cash flow is the only situation in which there is
no impact on the cost of capital. As long as there is a component of appropriation that does not
vary with the realization of the end-of-period-cash flow (for example, if it depends on the
expected end of period cash flow instead of the realization), or the quality of information affects
the “fixed” component of appropriation, there will be a non-zero impact on the cost of capital.
We can also interpret the parameters A0 and A1 as cash flow appropriated by other firms,
as opposed to by the manager. This allows us to tie our results to the large literature in
accounting on the proprietary costs of disclosure (see Verrecchia, 2001). In this literature,
increased disclosure allows other firms to make better strategic decisions to compete away some
of the profits of the disclosing firm We can adapt our model to this situation by assuming that
increased disclosure quality will increase A0 or A1. The comparative statics are straightforward,
and in this case increased disclosure quality weakly increases the firm’s cost of capital. In
particular, the most common assumption in the literature for the functional form of the
proprietary costs is that they reduce profits by a constant. In this case, improved accounting
information and disclosure increases A0, and strictly increases the firm’s cost of capital.
Finally, suppose improved accounting and disclosure influences the governance of all
firms, as in a mandatory change such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Again, the impact of
the indirect effects on the cost of capital is ambiguous. As above, if improved disclosure shifts

this case, the impact of an improvement on the firm’s expected cash flows will be approximately proportionate to
the change in the overall covariance, in which case the impact on the cost of capital will be approximately zero.
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only the “fixed” component of managerial misappropriation, firms’ cost of capital decreases.
The results are different, however, for the case where improved disclosure impacts only the
proportion (A1) of the cash flow appropriated by the manager.19 As above, the firm’s expected
cash flow rises by a factor of (1-A1). Because the cash flows of all firms shift proportionately,
the covariances of cash flows increase by a factor of (1-A1)2. In this case, mandatory disclosure
increases the firm’s cost of capital.
While this might seem unintuitive, the reason is straightforward. When the quality of
information and/or governance is poor, managers appropriate a considerable amount of the
payoff; in addition, they also absorb a considerable amount of risk. Managers do not mind
bearing this risk because they did not have to pay anything to acquire the appropriated payoff.
When accounting quality increases, however, managers steal less, so more of the payoff goes to
shareholders. But this implies that there is more risk in the economy, and this extra risk is
perfectly correlated with the existing risk. Therefore, the risk increases faster than the expected
payoff from the market (by a factor of [1-A1]2 versus 1-A1), so the aggregate risk premium goes
up, as well as the cost of capital. It is important to note that this does not mean investors are
worse off. Aggregate prices will generally increase, and investors will achieve higher expected
utilities.

4.2

Information and Investment Decisions

In the analysis above, the quality of the reporting system does not affect the “gross cash
flow” generated by the firm. Implicitly, this means that the quality of the accounting system
does not lead to a change in the manager’s production or investment decisions. There are
reasons to suspect that a change in the quality of the accounting system has an impact on the
19

We thank the anonymous referee for pointing this out to us.
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firm’s real decisions. For example, if the accounting system affects the firm’s cost of capital (for
the reasons discussed in the previous section), the optimal marginal investment changes. This
happens even in the absence of any concerns about agency problems.
To provide a simple example, assume the manager decides on a production or investment
quantity, k, based on information he has about the profitability of the investment. The end-of~
period cash flow is quadratic in the amount produced (invested): V j = kπ~ j − .5k 2 , where the
marginal productivity of investment, π~ j , is uncertain at the time the investment is made. The
manager observes a signal z before he makes his decision. This signal (which could constitute a
report or a forecast) is also disclosed subsequently to investors.20 We assume that π~ j is
normally distributed conditional upon the signal z, which implies that the cash flow distribution
satisfies:
~
E (V j | z ) = k ( z ) E (π~ | z ) − .5k 2 ( z ) ;
~
Var (V j | z ) = k 2 ( z )Var (π~ j | z ) ; and
~
~
~
Cov(V j , ∑Vk | z ) = k ( z )Cov(π~ j , ∑Vk | z ) .
k≠ j

k≠ j

Note that both the variance of firm j’s cash flow and the covariance of its cash flows with other
firms are increasing in k (assuming the covariance is positive).
Next, we abstract from agency considerations and assume that, to align the interests of
the manager with that of investors, the manager maximizes share price. That is, the manager
chooses the investment level k (z ) to maximize the beginning-of-the-period price of the firm.
Using eqn. (3), his objective function becomes

20

We can vary how much information the manager has relative to investors without changing the qualitative nature
of the result.
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Maximize
k (z)

=

⎡ ~
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⎢
⎢
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⎣
1
~
k ( z ) E (π~ | r ) − .5k 2 ( z ) −
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1
1+ Rf
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.

The optimal investment level then becomes

k * ( z) =

1
E (π~ | r ) −
Cov(π~ j ,
Nτ

~

∑Vk | z )

k≠ j

.

2
1+
Var (π~ j | z )
Nτ

(7)

From the previous section, as the quality of information improves, the conditional variance and
the conditional covariances decrease. Other things equal, this lowers the cost of capital. Eqn. (7)
shows, however, that this also causes the manager to become more aggressive in his investment
choice. This increase in k * ( z ) , in turn, increases the variance and covariances, which increases
the cost of capital. The equilibrium is then the net of these two effects. In our example, the
overall effect decreases the cost of capital.21
In essence, this example captures the notion that share markets play a role in allocating
capital and directing firms' investment choices (e.g., Tobin, 1982). Given this function,
information quality is important because it affects the market's ability to direct firms’ capital
allocation choices. As a consequence, information quality changes firms’ future cash flows, not
just the perceptions of these cash flows by market participants. Stated somewhat differently,
higher information quality improves the coordination between firms and investors with respect to
capital investment decisions. Anticipating this effect, investors demand a lower risk premium at
the outset and discount the expected cash flows of firms with higher information quality at a
21

It would be interesting to examine more general investment / production decision settings to see whether there are
conditions under with the “indirect” effect dominates the “direct effect” so that an increase in the quality of the
firm’s accounting system actually increases the firm’s cost of capital, rather than decreases it.
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lower rate of return. In short, investors price the risk of misalignment or misallocation that stems
from poor information quality.
When there are agency problems between firms and managers, the quality of the firm’s
accounting and information system also affects the magnitude of these agency problems, and
further changes the equilibrium production and investment decisions. Obviously, this involves
modeling and analyzing the incentive mechanisms used to motivate the manager and monitor his
decision. We leave this to future research to explore. It would be particularly interesting to
examine the interaction between firm-specific factors and cost of capital in such a setting. For
example, Christensen et al. (2002) examines how “idiosyncratic” risk affects managers’
investment decisions, and how compensation schemes should consider idiosyncratic and
nondiversifiable risks. Future research could explore how the cost of capital charged to
managers via compensation schemes influences their investment choices, and how this then
affects the cost of capital to shareholders.
As the discussion above suggests, a change in accounting and disclosure systems affects
the variances and covariances both directly and indirectly through real decisions. When a
change leads to a shift in both the expected value and the covariances, the overall impact on
cost of capital can be signed when the effects are reinforcing: that is, when expected cash flow
and the overall covariance with all firms’ cash flows move in opposite directions. When these
two factors move in the same direction, however, we cannot sign the overall impact without
placing more structure on the analysis. For example, we can sign the overall impact on the cost
of capital as long as the expected value does not change “too much.” We formalize this notion in
the next proposition.
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Proposition 4. Let µ denote the expected cash flows and σ denote the covariance of the firm’s

cash flows with those of the market given an information system and the decision that results
from that information system. Let µ ′ be the change in µ that accompanies the change in σ.
Then the overall impact of a change in σ on the firm’s cost of capital has the same sign as the
term,

µ
− µ′ .
σ

For example, an increase in σ without any increase in µ results in an increase in the firm’s cost
of capital, just as in Proposition 1. Similarly, if σ increases while µ decreases, these effects
reinforce each other, and the cost of capital increases. When σ and µ change in the same
direction, Proposition 4 places a bound on the extent of the impact on µ. In particular, the impact
on µ cannot exceed the ratio of the mean to the covariance. Note that this ratio can also be
interpreted as the inverse of a measure analogous to the coefficient of variation of the cash flows,
except it is the contribution of the firm to the overall variance of the market, not its own variance
per se that is relevant.
An alternative way to state the condition in Proposition 4 is that the overall impact of a
change in σ on the cost of capital is positive (negative) if

d ⎡µ ⎤
is less than (greater than)
ln
dσ ⎢⎣σ ⎥⎦

zero. For example, suppose that the expected value is related to the covariance through the
following functional form: µ = ψ 0 + ψ 1σ , where ψ0 and ψ1 are arbitrary positive constants.
Then we can use Proposition 4 to show that an increase in σ leads to an increase in the cost of
capital, whereas a decrease in σ results in a decrease in the cost of capital.

5.

Conclusion
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In this paper, we develop a framework that links the disclosure of accounting information
to the cost of capital. Specifically, we examine whether and how the quality of a firm’s
accounting information manifests in its cost of capital, despite the forces of diversification. We
build a model of a multi-security economy that is consistent with the CAPM, but expressed in
terms of cash flows, rather than returns. We augment this model with an information structure
where accounting information and firms’ disclosure policies are represented as noisy signals
about firms’ future cash flows.
Using this framework, we demonstrate that the quality of accounting information
influences a firm’s cost of capital, both directly by changing market participants’ perceptions
about the distribution of future cash flows, and indirectly by affecting real decisions that alter the
distribution of future cash flows. The direct effect occurs because higher quality disclosures
reduce a firm’s assessed covariances with other firms’ cash flows. This effect is not diversifiable
in large economies. Our finding provides a direct link between the quality of a firm’s disclosures
and accounting policies and its cost of capital. In addition, it extends prior work in the
estimation risk literature.
Our result that accounting information can lower a firm’s cost of capital contrasts with
contemporaneous work by Hughes et al. (2005). This paper only analyzes the direct effect of
information, and concludes that only the market-wide risk premium changes; information has no
cross-sectional effect. One reason for the apparent stark contrast to our results is the different
definition of cost of capital. In particular, Hughes et al. define cost of capital as the difference
between beginning-of-period price and end-of-period expected cash flows, whereas we use the
more conventional definition of the expected rate of return on the firm’s stock. Once we
translate results from Hughes et al. into our definition of cost of capital, cross-sectional effects
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on cost of capital manifest. The nature of the cross-sectional effects differs from ours, however,
due to the differences in the information structures assumed. Moreover, if indirect effects such
as those we consider were introduced into Hughes et al. there would be additional cross-sectional
differences in the effect of information on the cost of capital.
The indirect effect occurs because higher quality disclosures change a firm’s real
decisions. As a consequence, the ratio of a firm’s expected future cash flows to the covariance
of these cash flows with the sum of the cash flows of all firms changes. This ratio is a key
determinant of a firm’s cost of capital. We show the indirect effect can go in either direction, but
also derive conditions under which an increase in information quality leads to an unambiguous
decline in the cost of capital.
The direct and indirect effects that we discuss are entirely consistent with the CAPM. In
fact, the effects are captured by a fully-specified, forward-looking beta. If such a beta were
available, there would be no theoretical justification in our model for including other variables in
an empirical equation that attempts to explain or predict a firm’s cost of capital. It is important
to note, however, that this statement only holds if such a forward-looking beta is available.
Betas derived from historical returns will generally not accomplish this. Therefore, proxies for
the information effects outlined in this paper can be justified theoretically on the basis that they
provide better estimates for forward-looking betas. But this justification is different from one
where additional variables are included in the empirical specification to capture an “information
risk” factor outside the one-factor CAPM.
Finally, we briefly comment on the impact of mandated disclosures or accounting
policies on firms’ cost of capital. Based on our model, it is easy to show that increasing the
quality of mandated disclosures reduces the cost of capital for each firm in the economy
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(assuming that the expected cash flow of each firm and the covariance of that firm’s cash flow
with the market have the same sign). Nonetheless, disclosure regulation is likely to affect firms’
assessed covariances with other firms differentially; hence, the benefits of mandatory disclosures
are likely to differ across firms. For example, mandated disclosure may reduce the covariance of
one firm’s cash flows with the sum of the cash flows of all firms faster than for other firms.
Because mandated disclosure impacts the covariances of all firms with each other, a
significant portion of its impact on the cost of capital of firms will occur through lowering the
market risk premium. The effect of mandated disclosure on firms’ beta factors is more difficult
to predict. In particular, mandated disclosure cannot lower the beta coefficients of all firms
because beta coefficients measure relative risk, and hence must aggregate to 1.0 regardless of
the information set available to investors. The betas of those firms whose covariances of cash
flows with the sum of the cash flows of all firms decrease relatively faster are likely to fall, while
those whose covariances decrease relatively slower are likely to rise. Therefore, while mandated
disclosure results in each firm having a lower cost of capital, its impact on betas is ambiguous.
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APPENDIX

1

Proof of equation (3)

Consider an economy with J firms, indexed by the subscript j = 1, 2, ..., J, and a riskfree bond. We assume that the risk-free rate of return is Rf ; that is, an investment
of $1 in the risk-free bond yields a return of $1 + Rf . Let Ṽj and Pj represent the
uncertain cash flows of firm j and the market equilibrium price of firm j, respectively.
Along with the J firms, we introduce a perfectly competitive market for firm shares
comprised of N investors, indexed by the subscript i = 1, 2, ..., N, where N is large.
We represent investors (homogeneous) knowledge about firms’ cash flows by Φ.
Let U (c) represent investor i’s utility preference for an amount of cash c. Each
investor has a negative exponential utility function: that is, U (c) is defined by
µ

∙

¸¶

1
U (c) = τ 1 − exp − c
τ

,

where τ > 0 describes each investor’s (constant) tolerance for risk. Note that this
characterization of the negative exponential has the feature that as risk tolerance
becomes unbounded, U (c) converges asymptotically to risk neutrality:
µ

∙

¸¶

1
lim
U
(c)
=
lim
τ
1
−
exp
−
c
τ →∞
τ →∞
τ

→ c.

In addition, U (·) is standardized such that U (0) = 0.
Now consider the market price for firm j that prevails in a perfectly competitive
market in which N investors compete to hold shares in each firm, as well as a risk-free
bond. Let D̄i = {Di1 , Di2 , ..., Dij , ..., DiJ } represent the 1 × J vector of investor i’s
demand for ownership in J firms, where Dij represents investor i’s demand for firm j
n

o

∗
∗
∗
∗
expressed as percentage of the total firm; let D̄i∗ = Di1
, Di2
, ..., Dij
, ..., DiJ
represent
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∗
her vector of endowed ownership in firms, where Dij
represents her endowment in

firm j expressed as a percentage of the total firm; and let P̄ = {P1 , P2 , ..., Pj , ..., PJ }
represent the vector of firm prices, where once again Pj represents the price of firm j.
Let Bi and Bi∗ represent investor i’s demand for a risk-free bond and her endowment
in bonds, respectively. Each investor solves
1
max E[τ (1 − exp[− (D̄i {Ṽ1 , Ṽ2 , ..., ṼJ }0 + (1 + Rf ) Bi )])|Φ]
τ
D̄i ,Bi

(A1)

subject to the budget constraint
D̄i P̄ 0 + Bi = D̄i∗ P̄ 0 + Bi∗ .
Taking the expectation of eqn. (A1) and substituting in the relation Bi = D̄i∗ P̄ 0 +
Bi∗ − D̄i P̄ 0 yields the following expression
h
i
1
max τ (1 − exp[− (D̄i {E Ṽ1 |Φ − (1 + Rf ) P1 ,
τ
D̄i ,Bi
h
i
h
i
E Ṽ2 |Φ − (1 + Rf ) P2 , ..., E ṼJ |Φ − (1 + Rf ) PJ }0
1 1
D̄i ΛD̄i0 ]),
+ (1 + Rf ) D̄i∗ P̄ 0 + (1 + Rf ) Bi∗ ) +
2 τ2
h

(A2)
i

where Λ is an J × J covariance matrix whose s, t-th term is Cov Ṽs · Ṽt |Φ .
The first-order condition that maximizes eqn. (A2) with respect to Dij reduces
to
h

i

0 = E Ṽj |Φ − (1 + Rf ) Pj −

J
h
i
1X
Dik Cov Ṽj · Ṽk |Φ .
τ k=1

(A3)

Because collectively investors have claims to the cash flows of the entire firm, for each
k it must be the case that
with respect to i yields
³

h

PN

i=1

i

Dik = 1. Thus, summing over both sides of eqn. (A3)

0 = N E Ṽj |Φ − (1 + Rf ) Pj

´

N X
J
h
i
1X
−
Dik Cov Ṽj · Ṽk |Φ ,
τ i=1 k=1
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or
³

h

i

´

0 = N E Ṽj |Φ − (1 + Rf ) Pj −

J
h
i
1X
Cov Ṽj · Ṽk |Φ .
τ k=1

This, in turn, implies that the price for firm j is given by
h

Pj =

2

i

E Ṽj |Φ −

1
Cov
Nτ

h

Ṽj ·

1 + Rf

i

PJ

k=1 Ṽk |Φ

.

Proof of Proposition 1

From Lemma 1,
h

E R̃j

i

∙

where
H=

h

Nτ E Ṽj
h

Cov Ṽj ,

When
h

¸

Rf H + 1
=E
,
H −1
PJ

"

i

k=1 Ṽk

E Ṽj > 0 and Cov Ṽj ,
h

i

i

J
X

k=1

i.
#

Ṽk > 0,
h

H is increasing in both E Ṽj and Nτ , and decreasing in Cov Ṽj ,
h

i

also that the derivative of E R̃j with respect to H is negative:
h

∂E R̃j
∂H

i

h

PJ

k=1

i

Ṽk . Note

(H − 1) Rf − (Rf H + 1)
(H − 1)2
HRf − Rf − Rf H − 1
=
(H − 1)2
1 + Rf
= −
< 0.
(H − 1)2
=

i

h

i

Combining these, we have: E R̃j is decreasing in both E Ṽj and Nτ , and increasing
h

in Cov Ṽj ,
h

PJ

i

i

k=1 Ṽk . Finally, provided that H > 1, which is necessary for Pj > 0, we

have E R̃j is increasing in Rf . Q.E.D.
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3

Proof of Proposition 2

We assume that Ṽj , Ṽk , ε̃j , and ε̃k each have a normal distribution and define Z̃j and
Z̃k as Z̃j = Ṽj + ε̃j and Z̃k = Ṽk + ε̃k . Our only additional distributional assumption
is that Ṽj and Ṽk are independent of ε̃j and ε̃k , but not of each other. Taken together,
these assumptions imply that Ṽj , Ṽk , Z̃j , and Z̃k have a 4-variate normal distribution
with an unconditional covariance matrix given by
⎡

M=

⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣

h

i

h

i

V ar Ṽj
h

Cov Ṽj , Ṽk
V ar Ṽj
h

Cov Ṽj , Ṽk

h

Cov Ṽj , Ṽk
i

h

i

V ar Ṽk

i

V ar Ṽk

h

i

h

Cov Ṽj , Ṽk

i

h

i

V ar Ṽj

i

V ar Ṽj + V ar [ε̃j ]

h

i

h

Cov Ṽj , Ṽk

Cov Ṽj , Ṽk
h

h

⎤

i

⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
V ar Ṽk
⎥
⎥.
h
i
⎥
Cov Ṽj , Ṽk + Cov [ε̃j , ε̃k ] ⎥
⎥
⎦
h i

i

h

i

i

Cov Ṽj , Ṽk + Cov [ε̃j , ε̃k ] V ar Ṽk + V ar [ε̃k ]
h

i

h

i

Simplify the covariance matrix notationally by setting: V = V ar Ṽj ; U = V ar Ṽk ;
h

i

C = Cov Ṽj , Ṽk ; e = V ar [ε̃j ]; f = V ar [ε̃k ]; and c = Cov [ε̃j , ε̃k ]. This implies
⎡

M=

The inverse of M is
⎡

M −1 =

⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣

⎢ V
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣

C V

C

C U C

U

V

⎤

⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥.
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦

C V +e C +c

C U C +c U +f

UV f +U ef −U c2 −C 2 f
V U ef −V U c2 −C 2 ef +C 2 c2

−C 2 c−Cc2 +U V c
− V UCef
ef −V Uc2 −C 2 ef +C 2 c2

Cef −C 2 c−Cc2 +U V c
− V Uef
−V U c2 −C 2 ef +C 2 c2

V eU +V ef −V c2 −C 2 e
V U ef −V U c2 −C 2 ef +C 2 c2

f
− ef −c
2

c
ef −c2

c
ef −c2

e
− ef −c
2

f
− ef −c
2

c
ef −c2

f
ef −c2

c
− ef −c
2

c
ef −c2

e
− ef −c
2

c
− ef −c
2

e
ef −c2

Let m describe the submatrix
⎡

m=⎢
⎣

UV f +U ef −Uc2 −C 2 f
V U ef −V U c2 −C 2 ef +C 2 c2
2

2

Cef −C c−Cc +U V c
− V Uef
−V Uc2 −C 2 ef +C 2 c2
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2

2

⎤

−C c−Cc +U V c
− V UCef
ef −V U c2 −C 2 ef +C 2 c2 ⎥
⎦.
2
2
V eU +V ef −V c −C e
V Uef −V U c2 −C 2 ef +C 2 c2

⎤

⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥.
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦

Then the covariance matrix for Ṽj and Ṽk conditional on Z̃j and Z̃k is given by
⎡

V eU +V ef −V c2 −C 2 e
V U +V f +eU +ef −(C+c)2

m−1 = ⎢
⎣

UV c+Cef −Cc(C+c)
V U +V f +eU +ef −(C+c)2
f +Uef −U c2 −C 2 f

UV c+Cef −Cc(C+c)
V U +V f +eU +ef −(C+c)2

UV
V U +V f +eU +ef −(C+c)2

h

i

⎤

⎥
⎦.

The oﬀ-diagonal terms in m−1 describe Cov Ṽj , Ṽk |Zj , Zk ; converting this expression
back into non-simplified expressions yields
h

i

h

i

h

i

V ar Ṽk V ar Ṽj Cov [ε̃j , ε̃k ] + Cov Ṽj , Ṽk V ar [ε̃j ] V ar [ε̃k ]
h

Cov Ṽj , Ṽk |Zj , Zk =
h

h

i

³

h

i

´

−Cov Ṽj , Ṽk Cov [ε̃j , ε̃k ] Cov Ṽj , Ṽk + Cov [ε̃j , ε̃k ]

i

i

h

h

i

h

i

³

h

i

´2

V ar Z̃j V ar Z̃k − Cov Ṽj , Ṽk + Cov [ε̃j , ε̃k ]

i

h

i

h

i

,

where V ar Z̃j = V ar Ṽj + V ar [ε̃j ] and V ar Z̃k = V ar Ṽk + V ar [ε̃k ]. Now
suppose that ε̃j and ε̃k are uncorrelated. Then this expression reduces further to
h

i

h

Cov Ṽj , Ṽk |Zj , Zk = Cov Ṽj , Ṽk
h

i

i

h

V ar [ε̃j ] V ar [ε̃k ]

i

h

i

³

h

V ar Z̃j V ar Z̃k − Cov Ṽj , Ṽk
h

i´2 .

i

Finally, Cov Ṽj , Ṽk |Zj can be derived from the expression for Cov Ṽj , Ṽk |Zj , Zk by
h

i

assuming that V ar [ε̃k ] becomes unboundedly large while V ar Ṽk remains constant;
h

i

note that this implies that V ar Z̃k becomes unboundedly large. In other words,
h

Cov Ṽj , Ṽk |Zj

i

=

lim

V ar[ε̃k ]→∞

h

Cov Ṽj , Ṽk |Zj , Zk

h

→ Cov Ṽj , Ṽk

i

V ar [ε̃j ]
h

V ar Z̃j

Q.E.D.

4

i

i.

Proof of Proposition 3

The expected value and covariance of the net amount received by the firm’s shareholders are
h

i

h

i

E Ṽj |Q = (1 − A1 (Q)) E Ṽj∗ − A0 (Q) ,
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and
"

⎛

#

⎡

⎤⎞

J
J
h i
X
X
1
1 ⎝
[1 − A1 (Q)]2 V ar Vj∗ + [1 − A1 (Q)] Cov ⎣Ṽj ,
Cov Ṽj ,
Ṽk |Q =
Ṽk |Q⎦⎠ ,
Nτ
Nτ
k=1
k6=j

respectively. With a large number of firms, the firm-variance eﬀect is small; thus,
H (Q) can be expressed as
H (Q) =

1
Cov
Nτ

h

i

E Ṽj |Q
h

Ṽj ,

PJ

i

k=1 Ṽk |Q

h

i

(1 − A1 (Q)) E Ṽj∗ − A0 (Q)

≈

h

(1 − A1 (Q)) Cov Ṽj ,
h

i

PJ
h

Next, for convenience let E ∗ and C ∗ represent E Ṽj∗ and Cov Ṽj ,
spectively. Then

i.

k6=j Ṽk |Q

PJ

k6=j

i

Ṽk |Q , re-

(−A01 (Q) E ∗ − A00 (Q)) (1 − A1 (Q)) C ∗ − ([1 − A1 (Q)] E ∗ − A0 (Q)) (−A01 (Q) C ∗ )
∂H
=
∂Q
([1 − A1 (Q)] C ∗ )2
−A00 (Q) (1 − A1 (Q)) C ∗ − A0 (Q) A01 (Q) C ∗
=
([1 − A1 (Q)] C ∗ )2
−A00 (Q) (1 − A1 (Q)) − A0 (Q) A01 (Q)
=
.
(1 − A1 (Q))2 C ∗
Noting that A00 (Q) and A01 (Q) are both non-negative, provided that C ∗ > 0 we have
∂H
≥ 0,
∂Q
with

∂H
∂Q

= 0 if A0 (Q) = A00 (Q) = 0. Finally, from Lemma 1 the cost of capital is

decreasing in H (Q). Q.E.D.

5

Proof of Proposition 4

Cost of capital is defined as
h

i

E R̃j |Φ =

h

i

h

i

E Ṽj |Φ| −

h

P
1
Cov Ṽj , Jk=1 Ṽk |Φ|
Nτ
h
i
PJ
1
Cov
,
|Φ|
Ṽ
Ṽ
j
k
k=1
Nτ

Rf E Ṽj |Φ| +
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i

.

h

Let σ = Cov Ṽj ,
h

i

PJ

h

i

0
k=1 Ṽk |Φ| , µ = E Ṽj |Φ| , and µ =

i

This allows E R̃j |Φ to be defined as
h

i

E R̃j |Φ =

d
P
J

dCov[Ṽj ,

k=1

Ṽk |Φ|]

h

i

E Ṽj |Φ| .

1
Rf µ + Nτ
σ
.
1
µ − Nτ σ

In addition,
i
d h
E R̃j |Φ =
dσ

³

Rf µ0 +

= −
This implies that
provided that

d
E
dσ

h

1
Nτ

i

1
Nτ

´³

µ−

1
σ
Nτ

³

´

µ−

(σµ0 − µ) (Rf + 1)
³

µ−

1
σ
Nτ

´2

³

− Rf µ +
1
σ
Nτ

´2

1
σ
Nτ

´³

µ0 −

1
Nτ

´

.

R̃j |Φ assumes the same sign as the sign of the change in σ
µ0 <

µ
.
σ

h

i

In other words, a decrease in σ implies a decrease in E R̃j |Φ , provided that µ0 < µσ .
Q.E.D.
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